John Thomas Schieffer

1. (S) SUMMARY: During a visit to Tokyo October 7, INR Assistant Secretary Randall Fort consulted with counterparts from MOFA’s Intelligence and Analysis Service, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet and Intelligence Research Office (CIRO), the Ministry of Justice’s Public Security Information Agency (PSIA), and with uniformed and civilian officials at the Ministry of Defense. Discussions focused on …, …, and cyber security. The Director of CIRO also discussed his efforts to develop the capabilities of the Japanese intelligence community. … END SUMMARY.
12. (S) With regard to ongoing priorities, Mitani said his first one is to assure the passage of legislation to protect national security information. The fate of this bill, he explained, depends on the outcome of domestic politics which, at this point is difficult to predict. His second priority is the establishment of a human intelligence collection capability. The decision has been made to go very slowly with this process as the Japanese realize that they lack knowledge, experience, and assets/officers. A training process for new personnel will be started soon. A/S Fort agreed that it is prudent to go slowly and urged that a few, highly capable people be selected at first, rather than rushing things.
13. (S) A/S Fort urged Mitani to think about how Japan might be able to cooperate with us in the field of cyber security. Mitani replied that he has discussed this with Ambassador Schieffer and, as a result, his Information Technology Center will soon begin to collaborate with the National Security Agency. He noted that while Japan has the knowledge and experience to play a major role in this field, the challenge is to educate the public and politicians about why this is important.
15. (C) Director General Toshio Yanagi of the Ministry of Justice’s Public Security Information Agency (PSIA) told A/S Fort that his major areas of focus are on China and North Korea, as well as on collecting intelligence information to prevent terrorist attacks, with a major focus on the Southeast Asia region.
21. (C) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary Fort.
SCHIEFFER

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  1. shinichi Post author

    INR Assistant Secretary Fort Consults with Japanese counterparts

    Wikileaks

    https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TOKYO2980_a.html

    ================================================================
    INR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FORT CONSULTS WITH JAPANESE COUNTERPARTS
    Date:2008 October 24, 08:37 (Friday)
    Canonical ID:08TOKYO2980_a
    Original Classification:SECRET
    Current Classification:SECRET
    —————————————————————-
    )
     
    1. (S) SUMMARY: During a visit to Tokyo October 7, INR
    Assistant Secretary Randall Fort consulted with counterparts
    from MOFA’s Intelligence and Analysis Service, the Prime
    Minister’s Cabinet and Intelligence Research Office (CIRO),
    the Ministry of Justice’s Public Security Information Agency
    (PSIA), and with uniformed and civilian officials at the
    Ministry of Defense. Discussions focused on Japan’s views of
    recent events in Georgia, the health of Kim Jong-il and the
    stability of North Korea, the state of the Chinese economy
    and society, Pakistan, and cyber security. The Director of
    CIRO also discussed his efforts to develop the capabilities
    of the Japanese intelligence community. A/S Fort was
    accompanied by INR analysts John Merrill and Gregory Knight,
    who provided briefings on North Korea and China. END SUMMARY.
     
    ————————————–
    MOFA INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS SERVICE
    ————————————–
     
    2. (C) Director General Jiro Kodera, A/S Fort’s direct
    counterpart, shared Japan’s perspectives on the following
    topics:
     
    ————–
    Russia/Georgia
    ————–
     
    3. (C) Japan believes that, from Russia’s standpoint, recent
    military operations against Georgia were a success, achieving
    three of four strategic objectives Moscow had set: retaining
    influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; destroying Georgia’s
    military; and damaging Georgia’s economy in order to create
    internal instability. Its fourth objective, regime change,
    was not realized. Kodera termed Georgia’s experience as
    “disastrous” due largely to serious miscalculations made by
    President Saakashvili concerning Russia’s intent to resist
    Georgian attempts to assert territorial claims and the West’s
    willingness to come to Georgia’s aid. As a consequence,
    Georgia will now find it almost impossible to regain control
    of the two breakaway regions or to move forward on accession
    to the EU and NATO. However, Kodera believes the
    consequences for Russia could prove equally dire, both in
    terms of soured relations with the West and being tainted
    with a “bad guy” image that will be difficult to shake.
     
    4. (C) Looking ahead, Kodera predicted that Russia would be
    ready to move back into any of its former territories if it
    felt there were a chance of success. The key for the West,
    he said, is to avoid creating openings for Moscow by giving
    the impression that it lacks concern. Russia is realistic,
    he believes, and will not move into former territories if it
    sees that the cost, particularly in terms of public backlash
    in the West, is too high. Further, he thinks that reluctance
    to incur further international criticism will prevent Russia
    from moving on Ukraine.
     
    5. (C) In Japan’s view, the recent experience in Georgia
    shows that Prime Minister Putin is clearly in charge. Kodera
    described Putin as more assertive, aggressive and emotional
    than President Medvedev, who he characterized as more
    reserved. Putin remains essentially expansionist with regard
    to the former Soviet republics and is willing to sacrifice
    the well-being of the Russian people to regain “lost”
    territory, Kodera observed, adding that Russians tend to be
    less assertive towards their neighbors when they perceive
    their international prestige to be at stake. He opined that
    Russia’s “DNA” has yet to change from one that focuses on an
    authoritarian, security-oriented government preoccupied with
    outdated notions of spheres of influence.
     
    ——–
    Pakistan
    ——–
     
    6. (C) With regard to Pakistan, Kodera said that his main
    focus continues to be on terrorism. He blamed the country’s
    ingrained anti-Americanism and a worsening economic situation
    for the lack of progress in rooting out Al-Qaida and the
    Taliban from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
    He wondered whether the two organizations weren’t actually
    becoming better organized and supported, pointing to the
    recent attack on the Islamabad Marriott Hotel. He agreed
    with A/S Fort’s assessment of the situation and said that
    there is a need for the Pakistanis to shift away from the
    political system and structure that has historically
    prevailed in the tribal areas.
     
    ———–
    North Korea
    ———–
     
    7. (C) Japan’s concerns about North Korea, Kodera said,
    relate mostly to Kim Jong-il’s health and a range of
    succession issues – including the potential for a dynastic
    succession versus some form of temporary collective
    leadership, sources of legitimacy for a new leadership, and
    China’s preferences in the matter including how strongly it
    intends to press them. Kodera and his colleagues were very
    interested in U.S. views on the possibility that Chang
    Song-taek would play a leading role in a future government
    and whether he might lead an effort to modernize the country
    as a North Korean version of Deng Xiaoping. INR analyst John
    Merrill briefed Kodera on our views of the North Korean
    leadership situation and on Kim Jong-il’s leadership style.
    A/S Fort cautioned that it is difficult to speculate on what
    might come to pass, given the dearth of information available
    to analysts.
     
    8. (C) Kodera agreed that China will play little role in the
    succession process, although there is clearly a split within
    the North Korean military between generals who fought
    together with China and those who take a more nationalistic
    view. Kodera does not think China will risk a blow to its
    international prestige — particularly within the Non-Aligned
    Movement — by attempting to intervene in a North Korean
    succession. If it were to do so, it would only be under cover
    of some form of “international cooperation.” China repeatedly
    assures Japan, said Kodera, that there will be a smooth
    transition but it is difficult to tell if this is merely
    self-serving talk. China could send troops to stabilize
    North Korea if faced with chaos on its border but would
    likely couch the move as a form of humanitarian assistance to
    deflect accusations of meddling or of harboring territorial
    ambitions.
     
    9. (C) Kodera admitted to having few insights on Kim’s
    current condition but said he thought he might be recovering
    and would soon return to “invitational diplomacy” and restart
    the Six-Party Process. He lamented that Japan’s own “quiet
    negotiations” with Pyongyang were not going well at all and
    hoped that Kim would recover enough to direct a promised
    re-investigation into the fate of Japanese citizens abducted
    by the DPRK. Japanese economic assistance provides a strong
    incentive to the DPRK to fulfill its pledge on abductions,
    but Japan is also demanding simultaneous resolution of the
    nuclear and missile issues, Suzuki noted. Sequencing is very
    important, Kodera observed. Japan is ready to extend
    assistance upon denuclearization, but may not be able to meet
    DPRK expectations. Looking beyond denuclearization,
    negotiations over sales of missile technology could be
    another stumbling block, he noted, since it is one of the
    only means for North Korea to secure hard currency. Japan is
    unlikely to change its policy on humanitarian assistance to
    the DPRK, even in the event of a serious famine, but might
    participate in a multilateral approach through one of the
    many international organizations it helps support, such as
    UNICEF or UNDP. Aid to North Korea remains an extremely
    sensitive issue in Japan, Kodera noted, and hardliners in the
    Diet had become more prominent since the end of the Koizumi
    Administration in 2006.
     
    —————————————-
    CABINET AND INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH OFFICE
    —————————————-
     
    10. (S) CIRO Director Hideshi Mitani briefed A/S Fort on
    progress being made within the Japanese intelligence
    community and his major priorities for the future. Mitani,
    who has been in his position for roughly two and a half
    years, was recently reappointed and is now serving as
    Director under his third prime minister. He said that he is
    very proud of Japan’s new Community Intelligence Officer
    (CIO) program, which is modeled after our National
     
    Intelligence Officer system. Japan has five CIOs and they
    have recently begun to issue national intelligence estimates
    (NIEs). So far, Mitani is quite pleased that despite the
    small size of his operation, the quality of the analysis
    provided is quite high. He is happy that more of his staff
    is now coming from MOFA, but pointed out that his oldest and
    most experienced CIO is from the private sector.
     
    11. (S) Mitani also reviewed the makeup of the Joint
    Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is comprised of
    representatives from CIRO, MOFA, the Ministry of Defense, the
    National Police Agency (NPA), and the Ministry of Justice’s
    Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) — who make up the
    “core JIC” — and, more recently, representatives of the
    Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Finance Agency, and the
    Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which is
    interested in gathering intelligence to prevent the theft of
    Japanese trade secrets. Taken together, he referred to the
    whole group as the “expanded JIC.” One role the JIC plays is
    to approve all NIEs before they are distributed.
     
    12. (S) With regard to ongoing priorities, Mitani said his
    first one is to assure the passage of legislation to protect
    national security information. The fate of this bill, he
    explained, depends on the outcome of domestic politics which,
    at this point is difficult to predict. His second priority
    is the establishment of a human intelligence collection
    capability. The decision has been made to go very slowly
    with this process as the Japanese realize that they lack
    knowledge, experience, and assets/officers. A training
    process for new personnel will be started soon. A/S Fort
    agreed that it is prudent to go slowly and urged that a few,
    highly capable people be selected at first, rather than
    rushing things.
     
    13. (S) A/S Fort urged Mitani to think about how Japan might
    be able to cooperate with us in the field of cyber security.
    Mitani replied that he has discussed this with Ambassador
    Schieffer and, as a result, his Information Technology Center
    will soon begin to collaborate with the National Security
    Agency. He noted that while Japan has the knowledge and
    experience to play a major role in this field, the challenge
    is to educate the public and politicians about why this is
    important.
     
    14. (S) Mitani was interested in A/S Fort’s views on North
    Korea and the health of Kim Jong-il. He said the Japanese
    are skeptical about North Korean press reports that Kim is
    well, saying that a recent press release about Kim watching a
    soccer match says just that, that he “watched” the match,
    without specifically saying that he was there in person.
    Japan believes Kim is well enough to make decisions but is in
    the dark about how he is passing them along for
    implementation. Mitani also said the Japanese had closely
    studied the book by “Mr. Fujimoto,” Kim’s former Japanese
    sushi chef, which they think holds many keys to understanding
    Kim’s behavior.
     
    ———————————-
    PUBLIC SECURITY INFORMATION AGENCY
    ———————————-
     
    15. (C) Director General Toshio Yanagi of the Ministry of
    Justice’s Public Security Information Agency (PSIA) told A/S
    Fort that his major areas of focus are on China and North
    Korea, as well as on collecting intelligence information to
    prevent terrorist attacks, with a major focus on the
    Southeast Asia region. The major question with regard to
    China, now that the Olympics are over, is the country’s
    evolving social and economic conditions. PSIA believes that
    widening income gaps, problems with agricultural production,
    and issues of corruption are having serious impacts on social
    and economic conditions and bear close watching. Of the
    three, corruption may be the main destabilizing factor, said
    Yanagi. Corruption plays a major role in ongoing power
    struggles and has also led to a situation where prominent
    state-owned companies have become family businesses packed
    with relatives of officials with sway. A further major
    corruption scenario involves the taking of private land by
    officials who then sell it to developers. These actions are
    serving to discredit the government and may lead to unrest.
    Another destabilizing factor is the immigration into the
    cities by rural farmers who are seeking better lives.
     
    16. (C) Another major issue that could potentially create
    rifts between the people and the government in China is
    pollution, according to Yanagi. He said that the Chinese are
    anxious to receive Japanese technology for both pollution
    clean-up and for clean industry. Beijing is seeking Japanese
    ODA and private investment, but Japanese businesses are wary
    of the Chinese, fearing that they will steal technology and
    become rivals of the Japanese firms who provided it in the
    first place. So despite Chinese interest in forging closer
    relations with Japan, particularly in the steel, iron, and
    auto manufacturing sectors, there is very little technology
    transfer taking place.
     
    17. (C) With regard to North Korea, PSIA is closely watching
    this year’s harvest. Japan does not believe the situation is
    as dire as it was in the 1990’s, although they do not have
    enough information to formulate a solid opinion. Yanagi said
    he thinks there are still over 300 food markets in operation,
    but that attempts to impose firm regulations on them are
    creating friction with the people. PSIA, said Yanagi, also
    closely watches the volume of exports from China to North
    Korea for clues to understanding the situation in the North.
    The Japanese believe the North Korean economy is crippled by
    a lack of energy resources and crumbling, outdated
    infrastructure.
     
    18. (C) PSIA does not believe North Korea will abandon its
    nuclear capabilities, said Yanagi. Tokyo views that Kim
    Jong-il sees nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, a card
    on the diplomatic table, and as a means to retain the support
    of his people. He will not give these up. Furthermore,
    while China also claims it would like to see a nuclear-free
    Korean peninsula, it cannot take actions that will
    potentially destabilize North Korea. Finally, neither the
    North or China trusts each other, he concluded.
     
    ——————-
    MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
    ——————-
     
    19. (C) A/S Fort also visited the Ministry of Defense where
    he met separately with Defense Intelligence Headquarters
    Director Lt.Gen. Hokazono and Defense Policy Bureau Chief
    Takamizawa. Hokazono commented on Taiwan-China relations,
    which he noted appear to be stable at this time. He believes
    this is particularly impressive in light of the many
    challenges of the past year, including unrest in Tibet, the
    earthquake in Sichuan, and final preparations for the
    Olympics. However, Japan watches this relationship very
    closely and is concerned that it could change at any time.
    With regard to North Korea, Hokazono echoed other officials
    in expressing concern for the health of Kim Jong-il and any
    potential instability this might cause, particularly due to
    the fact that the North has missile and nuclear capabilities.
    He was very grateful for information shared by the U.S. on
    North Korea and on other issues as well.
     
    20. (C) Takamizawa, like Kodera, discussed Russia and
    Georgia, saying that the recent conflict raises serious
    questions about Russia’s potential for misconduct in the
    future, so much so that some are debating whether Japan needs
    to reevaluate force structure plans. A/S Fort also discussed
    with Takamizawa the role Japan might consider playing in
    protecting against cyberspace attacks.
     
    21. (C) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary Fort.
    SCHIEFFER
    ================================================================

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