The experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another’s body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. You can thus recognise the Other’s intentions, emotions, etc. This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity (i.e., what you experience as objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available – available to all other subjects. This does not imply that objectivity is reduced to subjectivity nor does it imply a relativist position, cf. for instance intersubjective verifiability).
In the experience of intersubjectivity, one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects, and one experiences oneself as existing objectively for these Others; one experiences oneself as the noema of Others’ noeses, or as a subject in another’s empathic experience. As such, one experiences oneself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one’s lifeworld, especially as “homeworld.”
Phenomenology (philosophy)
Empathy and intersubjectivity
Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_(philosophy)#Empathy_and_intersubjectivity
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Phenomenology (philosophy)
Phenomenology (from Greek phainómenon “that which appears” and lógos “study”) is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany. It then spread to France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl’s early work. Phenomenology should not be considered as a unitary movement; rather, different authors share a common family resemblance but also with many significant differences. Accordingly, “A unique and final definition of phenomenology is dangerous and perhaps even paradoxical as it lacks a thematic focus. In fact, it is not a doctrine, nor a philosophical school, but rather a style of thought, a method, an open and ever-renewed experience having different results, and this may disorient anyone wishing to define the meaning of phenomenology”.
Phenomenology, in Husserl’s conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. Phenomenology can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another.
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Empathy and intersubjectivity
In phenomenology, empathy refers to the experience of one’s own body as another. While we often identify others with their physical bodies, this type of phenomenology requires that we focus on the subjectivity of the other, as well as our intersubjective engagement with them. In Husserl’s original account, this was done by a sort of apperception built on the experiences of your own lived-body. The lived body is your own body as experienced by yourself, as yourself. Your own body manifests itself to you mainly as your possibilities of acting in the world. It is what lets you reach out and grab something, for instance, but it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing your point of view. This helps you differentiate one thing from another by the experience of moving around it, seeing new aspects of it (often referred to as making the absent present and the present absent), and still retaining the notion that this is the same thing that you saw other aspects of just a moment ago (it is identical). Your body is also experienced as a duality, both as object (you can touch your own hand) and as your own subjectivity (you experience being touched).
The experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another’s body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. You can thus recognise the Other’s intentions, emotions, etc. This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity (i.e., what you experience as objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available – available to all other subjects. This does not imply that objectivity is reduced to subjectivity nor does it imply a relativist position, cf. for instance intersubjective verifiability).
In the experience of intersubjectivity, one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects, and one experiences oneself as existing objectively for these Others; one experiences oneself as the noema of Others’ noeses, or as a subject in another’s empathic experience. As such, one experiences oneself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one’s lifeworld, especially as “homeworld.”
フッサール現象学における感情移入の問題
Einfuhlungsproblematik in der Phänomenologie Husserls
石田三千雄
Michio ISHIDA
http://www.lib.tokushima-u.ac.jp/repository/file/29000/20120314112343/LID201203142002.pdf
はじめに
フッサールは他者経験や相互主観性に関わる場面で、しばしば「感情移入」(Einfuhlung) という概念を晩年に至るまで使い続けた。フッサールが使う「感情移入」という概念は、テオドール・リップスから受け継いだものであるが、それはリップスとほとんど同じ意味で使われた概念なのか、それともそれに独自の意味が見出しうる概念であろうか。「感情移入」という概念は 19世紀末から 20世紀初めにかけて美学や心理学で盛んに使われていたが、今日ではもはや真面目に論じられてはいない。しかし感情移入は、私と他者の共同性を感じ取るという、他者経験の原初的次元を把握するために用いられた概念ではなかったであろうか(他者認識という場面に問題を限るが)。感情移入は、私と他者の共同性を、身体性や感情の次元で把握する試みーたとえ、それが失敗した試みであったとしてもーと見なすことができるであろう。