>Embassy Beijing

>

Ethnic riots like those in Xinjiang July 5-7 and in Tibet in March of 2008 differ markedly in origin and nature from mass incidents, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to PolOff on XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both present serious problems for the Party, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, but the Party leadership would not hesitate to open fire on Uighurs or Tibetans if they deemed it necessary to restore order. Mass incidents pose a different kind of threat, he said, as the leadership is “afraid” to fire on Han rioters for fear of sparking massive public outrage that would turn against the Party. XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff on XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Xinjiang riots and the June mass incidents were different in kind but shared an important similarity. In her view, at least some rioters in Xinjiang took to the streets because of general discontent unrelated to the immediate cause of the violence. Han people do not hate Uighurs and are not looking for revenge, she said, but some people “can always find an excuse to express their grievances.”

11 thoughts on “>Embassy Beijing

  1. s.A

    >ID 09BEIJING1970
    SUBJECT RISE IN MASS INCIDENTS WORRISOME BUT NOT YET A THREAT TO OVERALL STABILITY, CONTACTS SAY
    DATE 2009-07-13 10:10:00
    CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
    ORIGIN Embassy Beijing
    TEXT C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001970

    Summary
    1. (C) A jump in the number of "mass incidents," or violent protests against local governments, in June is unrelated to the recent ethnic riots in Xinjiang and does not signal a threat to overall social stability, Embassy contacts report. However, violent incidents indicate serious discontent below the surface that will worsen over time. The underlying causes are longstanding citizen hostility toward local officials due to corruption and abuse of power in China's Communist Party-controlled political order. Moreover, vested interests are pushing their demands more aggressively during a year of politically sensitive anniversaries, calculating that the authorities will be more inclined to compromise in the interest of maintaining stability. The Party has responded by boosting anti-riot training for local officials, temporarily broadening the boundaries for expression of public opinion on the Internet while simultaneously targeting specific websites for tight control, and attempting to re-invigorate village elections. Contacts tell us that on campus, a tight student job market will not likely lead to destabilizing political activism in the short run, but the rise of left-wing nationalism is a trend to watch. The Xinjiang riots are different in kind and origin, but, like mass incidents, show the volatility of pent-up frustration and anger across China. End Summary.

    Reply
  2. s.A

    >Viewing cable 09BEIJING1970, RISE IN MASS INCIDENTS WORRISOME BUT NOT YET A THREAT TO OVERALL STABILITY, CONTACTS SAY

    If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

    Reference ID: 09BEIJING1970
    Created: 2009-07-13 10:21
    Released: 2010-12-04 21:30
    Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    Origin: Embassy Beijing

    VZCZCXRO5552
    OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #1970/01 1941021
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 131021Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5146
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001970

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2034
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC CH
    SUBJECT: RISE IN MASS INCIDENTS WORRISOME BUT NOT YET A THREAT TO OVERALL STABILITY, CONTACTS SAY

    REF: 08 BEIJING 2839

    Classified By: Acting Political Minster Counselor Ben Moeling. Reasons
    1.4 (b/d).

    Summary
    ——-

    ¶1. (C) A jump in the number of "mass incidents," or violent
    protests against local governments, in June is unrelated to
    the recent ethnic riots in Xinjiang and does not signal a
    threat to overall social stability, Embassy contacts report.
    However, violent incidents indicate serious discontent below
    the surface that will worsen over time. The underlying
    causes are longstanding citizen hostility toward local
    officials due to corruption and abuse of power in China's
    Communist Party-controlled political order. Moreover, vested
    interests are pushing their demands more aggressively during
    a year of politically sensitive anniversaries, calculating
    that the authorities will be more inclined to compromise in
    the interest of maintaining stability. The Party has
    responded by boosting anti-riot training for local officials,
    temporarily broadening the boundaries for expression of
    public opinion on the Internet while simultaneously targeting
    specific websites for tight control, and attempting to
    re-invigorate village elections. Contacts tell us that on
    campus, a tight student job market will not likely lead to
    destabilizing political activism in the short run, but the
    rise of left-wing nationalism is a trend to watch. The
    Xinjiang riots are different in kind and origin, but, like
    mass incidents, show the volatility of pent-up frustration
    and anger across China. End Summary.

    Reply
  3. s.A

    >Violent Protests in June: Hubei and Jiangxi
    ——————————————-

    ¶2. (C) A wave of new "mass incidents" (China's term for
    protest activity that the leadership views as threatening to
    stability) erupted in June in several parts of China and was
    widely reported in local media. In one of the two major
    incidents, a June 17-20riot in Shishou City, Hubei Province,
    was triggered by the mysterious death of a chef in a
    government-owned hotel. The number of rioters quickly
    swelled from a few dozen to thousands as rumors spread that
    the chef was murdered by the hotel manager, in league with
    city officials, for threatening to disclose an alleged drug
    ring run out of the hotel. The riot was quelled after
    hundreds of rioters were injured in clashes with security
    forces and many police vehicles were damaged or destroyed.
    Another large protest was staged by more than one hundred
    furniture makers in Nankang City, Jiangxi Province, on June
    ¶15. The furniture makers gathered in front of the city
    government building to protest a new tax on the industry
    already hit hard by declining export demand. The Nankang
    demonstrators overturned police vehicles and blocked a major
    highway for several hours. The protest subsided the same day
    when municipal authorities rescinded the tax on orders from
    the provincial governor.

    Reply
  4. s.A

    >Mass Incidents Are Not All the Same
    ———————————–

    ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to PolOff on
    June 26 that the Hubei and Jiangxi incidents, respectively,
    represented different kinds of social protests even
    though both were indicative of simmering discontent
    lying just below the surface of Chinese society. He said
    that Shishou was similar to the Weng'an riots in Guizhou
    Province last year in which pent-up anger toward the
    government erupted spontaneously in response to an event that
    had little or no relationship to the immediate concerns or
    grievances of the protestors. (Note. See ref: as many as
    30,000 protestors rioted for several days in June 2008,
    destroying the Wengan Party headquarters and other official
    property. The local Party Secretary eventually resigned.)
    While disturbing to the leadership, such events were
    nonetheless isolated, localized incidents that could be
    contained, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed. The violence in
    Jiangxi, on the other hand, represented a systemic problem, in
    XXXXXXXXXXXX view.
    This kind of protest was more dangerous, he said, because it
    was issue-driven and affected interests that cut across local
    and regional boundaries, and hence held the potential to
    spread to other areas.

    ¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said it was very difficult
    to assess the overall impact of mass incidents on social
    stability, but, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, he stressed the
    importance of distinguishing between the spontaneous,
    random violence of Weng'an and Shishou and protests
    driven by the clash of

    BEIJING 00001970 002 OF 004

    "vested interests" (liyi you guanfang). In a meeting with
    PolOff on June 30, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Weng'an-type
    riots tended to be "seasonal" in nature, occurring during the
    summer when lots of people were in the streets. The Jiangxi
    protest, on the other hand, was triggered by those with veste
    interests of all kinds. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that there
    had been many such protests recently: In addition to the widely
    publicized taxi-driver strikes in several provinces, there had been
    bus driver strikes, elementary and middle-school teacher strikes
    (Chongqing), and wharf worker and boatmen strikes (in
    Guizhou), among others, all of which involved disputes over
    salaries. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the timing of these strikes
    and protests was deliberate. Once Party leaders had declared 2009
    a year of sensitive anniversaries and had called for redoubled
    efforts to ensure "harmony" and stability, people pressed
    hard for the government to satisfy their demands, calculating
    that authorities would be more responsive in order to
    maintain stability.

    Reply
  5. s.A

    >Underlying Cause: China's Party System
    ————————————–

    ¶5. (C) The heart of the problem, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained,
    was a political order that gave local officials enormous power,
    including control over the distribution of wealth and the
    resources to ensure that their own interests were well
    served. As a result, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, this "structural
    contradiction" had resulted in a long-term hostile
    environment, characterized by a breakdown of trust between
    local officials and residents and near-total lack of official
    credibility. When officials spoke, XXXXXXXXXXXX said,
    "no one pays attention" because "no one believes anything
    a cadre says." In his view, this situation unfairly penalized those
    officials who were capable and honest, with a recent case in
    Zhengzhou, Henan province being the most recent example. In
    a slip of the tongue that brought the point home, a Zhengzhou
    official became the focus of Internet praise and ridicule
    when he admitted in a public exchange with a reporter that
    China's media and local officials served the interests of the
    Party rather than the people. In response to a state-owned
    radio reporter's criticism of city officials for illegally
    building luxury villas on land that had been allocated for
    low-income housing, the official angrily shot back "for whom
    do you speak, the Party or the people," with the clear
    implication that he and the reporter both spoke for the
    Party. The reporter, apparently not realizing the
    implications of the remark, published it as an example of
    imperious officialdom. Some netizens praised the official
    for speaking the truth while others mocked him for blatantly
    ignoring the interests of ordinary people. The phrase "for
    whom do you speak" became the catch phrase of the day on the
    Internet, a symbol of people's deep distrust of officials and
    anger at the systemic disregard for rule of law and citizen
    rights. This was a "structural" problem, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    repeated, embedded in the nature of the cadre system, which
    even President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had so far
    been unable to crack, despite robust efforts. The situation could
    only get worse before it gets better, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    concluded, thus, "we can expect more and more "mass incidents."

    ¶6. (C XXXXXXXXXXXX, too, asserted that "structural
    contradictions" lay at the heart of the mass incident
    problem. People saw official machinations, corruption, or
    avarice behind every negative event, he said, noting the
    recent collapse of a 13-story building in Shanghai as the
    most recent example of this mindset. Shanghai was one of
    China's better-run cities, with an experienced and savvy
    cadre force and a clean Party Secretary, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    opined, but people immediately jumped to the conclusion
    that corruption was the culprit. (Note: Chinese media have since
    reported that the collapse was caused by inept construction
    workers who allowed dirt to pile up on one side of the building
    even as they excavated a deep hole on the other side.) However,
    this lack of trust and credibility showed a deeper flaw in
    China's political order. As a result, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    predicted, more mass incidents lay ahead. Although people
    blamed local officials for their problems and still viewed the
    central government as their last hope for redress of grievances
    this could change if the financial crisis persisted.

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  6. s.A

    >Rights Lawyer: no Threat to Stability
    ————————————-

    ¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on June 23 that
    he thought that mass incidents had not reached a stage
    where they posed a threat to China's overall stability.
    While they represented an expression of general anger
    over citizens' personal situations and deep resentment
    toward Party officials, they were still localized.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX said the underlying dynamic was
    a self-perpetuating cycle

    BEIJING 00001970 003 OF 004

    of violence and counter-violence on both sides born of a
    "contradiction" in citizen-official relationships. If local
    authorities were actually to follow the law, he observed,
    this would mean relaxing control and allowing more freedom of
    expression. People would respond by criticizing the
    government or by making demands that authorities were not
    willing to meet. Thus, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained,
    authorities kept a tight lid on all social discontent which in
    turn fostered seething resentment that periodically erupte
    into violent protest. The official response to these protests often
    amplified popular anger and frustration, thus continuing the
    cycle. There will be no "Chinese Gorbachev," he exclaimed,
    no breakthrough in the short term. The only answer, in
    XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view, was continued, gradual, and
    patient education in "the spirit of rule of law" among the people
    to eliminate their "slave mentality."

    Reply
  7. s.A

    >Cadre Training, Internet Control, Local Elections
    ——————————————— —-

    ¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the "lessons of Weng'an,"
    both positive and negative, had been carefully studied by
    central authorities and that, in anticipation of an upsurge in
    protests this year, the central government had launched an
    ambitious program of anti-riot and crowd-control training for
    local officials. Three thousand county level administrators,
    3,000 county-level public security directors, 2,000
    county-level discipline inspection directors and 500 local
    procuratorate cadres had already completed such training in
    Beijing. They were in turn expected to train the relevant
    personnel in subordinate jurisdictions.

    ¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that the Party had bee
    following a carefully calibrated approach to Internet control
    during the year, especially in the runup to National Day,
    allowing more general expression of public opinion, while
    targeting specific websites for close monitoring. The highly
    publicized webchats with netizens conducted by Hu Jintao and
    Wen Jiabao earlier in the year were designed to reinforce the
    public perception that top leaders were encouraging greater
    public discussion on the Internet, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX himself had noticed a significant uptick
    in the volume of Internet chatter, including provocative
    commentary on sensitive issues. (Note: Recent examples include
    an article in the June 1 issue of the Xinhua-owned news weekly
    Outlook Weekly (Liaowang) analyzing the factors that contribute
    to mass incidents and predicting a significant increase of such
    events this year; and a blog by a Shishou official who was
    critical of the city government's efforts to "mislead the
    public" by blaming the riot on local criminals. The official
    called for an objective analysis of the causes of the riots,
    which he attributed to poor government and police corruption
    in Shishou, to prevent such events in the future.)

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  8. s.A

    >¶10. (C) At the same time, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, the Party
    was targeting "ideological" and "protest" websites of both the
    right and the left for more aggressive monitoring. In addition to
    the usual practice of issuing propaganda guidance by telephone,
    text message, or by directives to select webmasters,
    propaganda authorities were now designating specific websites
    as sites of special concern. He said that the State Council
    and Beijing Information Offices recently convened a meeting
    of Internet monitors to discuss tight control of seven
    websites: Two ultra-left sites, Utopia (wuyou zhi xiang) and
    Maoflag; a site featuring a wide range of reform-oriented
    urban middle-class views, Boke (Bokee); and four sites with a
    "liberal" reputation frequented by professionals and
    intellectuals: Xici, Tianya, Tianyi, and China Elections.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX; XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he had
    been told by a friend with Internet monitoring responsibility
    that there would be a drastic tightening up on Internet content
    next year, once the sensitive commemoration season was over.

    ¶11. (C) Taking a somewhat different tack, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    told PolOff on XXXXXXXXXXXX that, in light of
    high-profile unrest incidents, the Communist Party was
    looking to revitalize village elections as a means of relieving
    social pressures and providing a nonviolent outlet to political
    grievances. Specifically, the Party's Central Organization
    Department had recently convened a meeting on ensuring
    compliance with existing legislation mandating regular
    village elections. In recent years apathy and corruption on
    the part of local officials had resulted in many villages
    failing to hold elections as required by law. According to
    XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Party viewed this as a dangerous
    trend that could exacerbate the simmering grievances.
    Nonetheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX was not optimistic that
    village elections could realize the Party's goal of reducing
    the frequency of unrest.

    BEIJING 00001970 004 OF 004

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  9. s.A

    >Student Activism: Leftist Nationalism, Not Employment
    ——————————————— ——–

    ¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he didn't foresee a stability
    problem emerging from the tight job market for graduating
    college students, but he was concerned about the increase of
    "radical nationalism" and a "leftward drift" among college
    students that could lead to destabilizing student activism in the
    future. Graduating seniors and graduate students at China's
    elite universities were having no trouble finding jobs, he
    said, although those from second- and third-tier universities
    were running into greater obstacles. However, potential
    discontent over job pressure was offset by the many graduates
    who had responded to the Party's call, and incentives, to
    take jobs in the hinterland and by the thousands more who
    were lining up to join the military. Growing student
    nationalism, on the other hand, was a trend to be concerned
    about, in XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, especially when wedded to
    "leftist" politics. He said he had warned Party leaders that the
    student threat of the future would not come from
    pro-democracy activists but from the anti-democratic left who
    may take to the streets to demand a return to "true
    socialism." XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that as many
    as 20 percent of the students at People's University were
    "left-leaning radical nationalists." Many, he said, were active
    on the ultra-left web portal "Utopia" where they posted
    comments under the rubric of "the alliance of citizens
    on the left" (gongmin zuo lianmeng).

    Reply
  10. s.A

    >Mass Incidents Are Not Ethnic Riots
    ———————————–

    ¶13. (C) Ethnic riots like those in Xinjiang July 5-7 and in
    Tibet in March of 2008 differ markedly in origin and nature
    from mass incidents, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to
    PolOff on XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both present serious problems
    for the Party, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, but the Party
    leadership would not hesitate to open fire on Uighurs or
    Tibetans if they deemed it necessary to restore order.
    Mass incidents pose a different kind of threat, he said,
    as the leadership is "afraid" to fire on Han rioters for fear
    of sparking massive public outrage that would turn against
    the Party. XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff on
    XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Xinjiang riots and the June
    mass incidents were different in kind but shared an important
    similarity. In her view, at least some rioters in Xinjiang
    took to the streets because of general discontent unrelated to
    the immediate cause of the violence. Han people do not hate
    Uighurs and are not looking for revenge, she said, but some
    people "can always find an excuse to express their grievances."

    GOLDBERG

    Reply

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