Afghanistan causal diagrams covered incorrectly by a variety of media
A few detailed diagrams used by the US Military highlighting key dynamics in Afghanistan have been cited by several media sources, with many incorrect assumptions and descriptions. Since PA Consulting Group was involved in this work and media misstatements are continuing, we are providing some basic background on the origins and use of these materials.
Analyzing dynamics in Afghanistan
In 2009, PA worked with US military officers to analyze the dynamics and challenges in Afghanistan, as one of many inputs to support those involved in planning and strategy. This effort built on previous relevant PA work and integrated a wide range of research and analysis from other sources. A variety of briefing materials and analyses were developed to provide planners with a structured approach to help review options and potential secondary effects. The effort included development of detailed diagrams of cause-and-effect dynamics using an approach called system dynamics. One of the officers involved briefed the work in theater. It was found to be helpful by several senior officers and thus the materials were briefed more widely.
The causal diagram
After one of the wider briefings last year, a few detailed diagrams were shared by an attendee with a reporter. The materials did not provide much context or introduction and were highly detailed causal diagrams intended for planners. For those immersed in the issues on a daily basis, these provided a helpful reference. The diagrams were not intended to stand alone, nor designed for a broad audience, and even for the planners were introduced and built up gradually, with a poster-sized version used as a reference. An attendee noted that despite media portrayal of this as a single highly complicated chart, the chart was developed in an hour-long ‘build’ reviewing complex dynamics in Afghanistan, and was useful learning for participants.
Summary
The situation in Afghanistan is complex. Not surprisingly, detailed diagrams of a complicated situation that are developed for use by those immersed in the issues may be confusing to broader audiences, especially when shown out of context. The US Military is working hard to understand the key issues and it makes sense that they are analyzing the situation rigorously with a variety of methods to support evaluation of potential strategies
The McChrystal Afghanistan PowerPoint slide: can you do any better?
Is the “Afghanistan Stability/COIN Dynamics – Security” slide a set of meaningless squiggles or a comprehensive guide to Afghanistan? And how would you improve on it?
Well you can see why Nato hasn’t cracked Afghanistan yet. The Microsoft PowerPoint slide which drove US military General Stanley McChrystal to declare that “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war” at a briefing in Kabul last summer has led to big questions about the world’s reliance on the presentation software.
As Julian Borger wrote yesterday:
The diagram has an undeniable beauty. Done the right way (embroidered perhaps) it would make a lovely wallhanging and an ideal gift for the foreign policy-maker in your life. But it is a bit of a red herring … It was designed to convey the complexity of the Afghan conflict. But the big problem with PowerPoint is that it makes everything seem simple.It does not link ideas or facts in any kind of human narrative. It just lists them as bullet-points, a shopping list of things to do or jobs already done.
So, here’s the Datablog challenge: how would you do it? Is there another way to present the information that doesn’t look like it has been put together by a kitten with a ball of string?
Post links to them in the comment field below. The best will get displayed here. Or could even change the course of the war. Or something like that.
I remember this chart from my time as a staff officer at ISAF HQ in 2010 (even we called it “the spaghetti chart”). For a while, anything we briefed in the daily update had to include where it fit in with this chart (like, draw an arrow or arrows to it).
I took the time to read the entire build for this chart that PA Consulting put together. While I agree with their defense that they were trying to depict a very complex environment in a chart, and that this one slide should not be taken out of context, in the end all the analysis tells you is that everything is connected to everything else – and therefore, even if you go carefully through the whole analysis, it tells you nothing. I think this relates to the problem with systems analysis itself, at least as applied to counterinsurgency – because it starts with the assumption that the enemy is a system, or a system of systems, and that therefore we can find the key points in that system, and by addressing those, “win.” It is not so…in the end, as complex as it looks, it is an oversimplification.
How would I do better? First of all, I would not try to depict such a complex situation on one slide – no matter how carefully you build up to it, in the end it is a waste of time. Second, drop the “systems” assumption – there is no one thing or small set of key things that will “win” a COIN fight for you. You’re dealing with humans, not machines, so understand it like humans do, not like machines might. Focus on the main things you have to do to convince the humans to give their support to the government rather than the insurgents, and convince the insurgents to give up – that is the only way to “win.” There are no silver bullets, magic methods, or key nodes…it is very local, takes years and years of patience, and depends a LOT on the government itself. It has to earn the loyalty of its people, village by village, by providing good governance. If you are not the government, but an outside force supporting that government, then you CANNOT win the fight – all you can do is give that government time, space, and a chance. If that government does not earn the loyalty of its people, in the end there is nothing you as an outside force can do.
Remember, there is a reason an insurgency exists in the first place. People don’t launch insurgencies for the hell of it – it is difficult, highly dangerous, involves great discomfort over a long period of time, and almost always fails in the end. Something has to push people pretty hard for this to start, meaning either a great deal of grievance with their own government, or a big push from an outside force, or both. A plan that does not address those things will not win, no matter what else you do.
So I would look at it like this, to keep it simple – how much do people trust and support their government, and why or why not, village by village? Which outside support is coming in to the insurgents, and can we reduce it or cut it off entirely? Where are the insurgent’s safe areas, and can you deprive them of those? These are the things you need to understand and address, stay focused. It is not entirely a military thing. For the military, the focus has to be establishing a secure environment – this is VERY boots-on-the-ground intensive. The number of insurgents you kill or capture is secondary…if people feel safe enough to work for you and to tell you things, you can make progress. Government, civil society, and aid groups have a chance to improve people’s lives and establish good governance. If this does not happen, and/or the local forces don’t take over the security role, eventually you will have provided all the time, space, and chance you can. That is reality.
Afghanistan causal diagrams
by Tom Mullen
http://www.paconsulting.com/afghanistan-causal-diagram/
Afghanistan causal diagrams covered incorrectly by a variety of media
A few detailed diagrams used by the US Military highlighting key dynamics in Afghanistan have been cited by several media sources, with many incorrect assumptions and descriptions. Since PA Consulting Group was involved in this work and media misstatements are continuing, we are providing some basic background on the origins and use of these materials.
Analyzing dynamics in Afghanistan
In 2009, PA worked with US military officers to analyze the dynamics and challenges in Afghanistan, as one of many inputs to support those involved in planning and strategy. This effort built on previous relevant PA work and integrated a wide range of research and analysis from other sources. A variety of briefing materials and analyses were developed to provide planners with a structured approach to help review options and potential secondary effects. The effort included development of detailed diagrams of cause-and-effect dynamics using an approach called system dynamics. One of the officers involved briefed the work in theater. It was found to be helpful by several senior officers and thus the materials were briefed more widely.
The causal diagram
After one of the wider briefings last year, a few detailed diagrams were shared by an attendee with a reporter. The materials did not provide much context or introduction and were highly detailed causal diagrams intended for planners. For those immersed in the issues on a daily basis, these provided a helpful reference. The diagrams were not intended to stand alone, nor designed for a broad audience, and even for the planners were introduced and built up gradually, with a poster-sized version used as a reference. An attendee noted that despite media portrayal of this as a single highly complicated chart, the chart was developed in an hour-long ‘build’ reviewing complex dynamics in Afghanistan, and was useful learning for participants.
Summary
The situation in Afghanistan is complex. Not surprisingly, detailed diagrams of a complicated situation that are developed for use by those immersed in the issues may be confusing to broader audiences, especially when shown out of context. The US Military is working hard to understand the key issues and it makes sense that they are analyzing the situation rigorously with a variety of methods to support evaluation of potential strategies
The McChrystal Afghanistan PowerPoint slide: can you do any better?
Is the “Afghanistan Stability/COIN Dynamics – Security” slide a set of meaningless squiggles or a comprehensive guide to Afghanistan? And how would you improve on it?
by Simon Rogers
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/apr/29/mcchrystal-afghanistan-powerpoint-slide?guni=Graphic:in%20body%20link
Well you can see why Nato hasn’t cracked Afghanistan yet. The Microsoft PowerPoint slide which drove US military General Stanley McChrystal to declare that “When we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war” at a briefing in Kabul last summer has led to big questions about the world’s reliance on the presentation software.
As Julian Borger wrote yesterday:
So, here’s the Datablog challenge: how would you do it? Is there another way to present the information that doesn’t look like it has been put together by a kitten with a ball of string?
Post links to them in the comment field below. The best will get displayed here. Or could even change the course of the war. Or something like that.
Просто о Witology
http://witology.com/blog/library/detail/162/
I remember this chart from my time as a staff officer at ISAF HQ in 2010 (even we called it “the spaghetti chart”). For a while, anything we briefed in the daily update had to include where it fit in with this chart (like, draw an arrow or arrows to it).
I took the time to read the entire build for this chart that PA Consulting put together. While I agree with their defense that they were trying to depict a very complex environment in a chart, and that this one slide should not be taken out of context, in the end all the analysis tells you is that everything is connected to everything else – and therefore, even if you go carefully through the whole analysis, it tells you nothing. I think this relates to the problem with systems analysis itself, at least as applied to counterinsurgency – because it starts with the assumption that the enemy is a system, or a system of systems, and that therefore we can find the key points in that system, and by addressing those, “win.” It is not so…in the end, as complex as it looks, it is an oversimplification.
How would I do better? First of all, I would not try to depict such a complex situation on one slide – no matter how carefully you build up to it, in the end it is a waste of time. Second, drop the “systems” assumption – there is no one thing or small set of key things that will “win” a COIN fight for you. You’re dealing with humans, not machines, so understand it like humans do, not like machines might. Focus on the main things you have to do to convince the humans to give their support to the government rather than the insurgents, and convince the insurgents to give up – that is the only way to “win.” There are no silver bullets, magic methods, or key nodes…it is very local, takes years and years of patience, and depends a LOT on the government itself. It has to earn the loyalty of its people, village by village, by providing good governance. If you are not the government, but an outside force supporting that government, then you CANNOT win the fight – all you can do is give that government time, space, and a chance. If that government does not earn the loyalty of its people, in the end there is nothing you as an outside force can do.
Remember, there is a reason an insurgency exists in the first place. People don’t launch insurgencies for the hell of it – it is difficult, highly dangerous, involves great discomfort over a long period of time, and almost always fails in the end. Something has to push people pretty hard for this to start, meaning either a great deal of grievance with their own government, or a big push from an outside force, or both. A plan that does not address those things will not win, no matter what else you do.
So I would look at it like this, to keep it simple – how much do people trust and support their government, and why or why not, village by village? Which outside support is coming in to the insurgents, and can we reduce it or cut it off entirely? Where are the insurgent’s safe areas, and can you deprive them of those? These are the things you need to understand and address, stay focused. It is not entirely a military thing. For the military, the focus has to be establishing a secure environment – this is VERY boots-on-the-ground intensive. The number of insurgents you kill or capture is secondary…if people feel safe enough to work for you and to tell you things, you can make progress. Government, civil society, and aid groups have a chance to improve people’s lives and establish good governance. If this does not happen, and/or the local forces don’t take over the security role, eventually you will have provided all the time, space, and chance you can. That is reality.