Which is prior, the whole or its parts?
The monist holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One. The pluralist holds that the parts are prior to their whole, and thus tends to consider particles fundamental, with metaphysical explanation snaking upward from the many.
There seem to be physical and modal considerations that favor the monistic view. Physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes. Modally, mereology allows for the possibility of atomless gunk, with no ultimate parts for the pluralist to invoke as the ground of being.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole
by Jonathan Schaffer
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 119, No. 1, 2010
https://www.jonathanschaffer.org/monism.pdf
Consider a circle and a pair of its semicircles. Which is prior, the whole or its parts? Are the semicircles dependent abstractions from their whole, or is the circle a derivative construction from its parts? Now in place of the circle consider the entire cosmos (the ultimate concrete whole), and in place of the pair of semicircles consider the myriad particles (the ultimate concrete parts). Which if either is ultimately prior, the one ultimate whole or its many ultimate parts?
The monist holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One. The pluralist holds that the parts are prior to their whole, and thus tends to consider particles fundamental, with metaphysical explanation snaking upward from the many. Just as the materialist and idealist debate which properties are fundamental, so the monist and pluralist debate which objects are fundamental.
I will defend the monistic view. In particular I will argue that there are physical and modal considerations that favor the priority of the whole. Physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes. Modally, mereology allows for the possibility of atomless gunk, with no ultimate parts for the pluralist to invoke as the ground of being.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole Jonathan Schaffer
[Draft of 12/16/2006]
http://people.umass.edu:80/schaffer/papers/Monism.pdf
(Google Translate)
一元論： 全体のプライオリティー （ジョナサン・シェーファー）
全体とその一部、どちらが先か？ 一元論者は、全体はその部分に先立つと考え、したがって宇宙を基本的なものとみなし、形而上学的な説明が一者から下にぶら下がっていると見なす。 多元主義者は、部分は全体よりも先にあると考えており、そのため、形而上学的な説明が多数から上に向かって蛇行しながら、粒子が基本であると考える傾向がある。 一元論的見解を支持する物理的および様相的な考慮事項があるようだ。 物理的には、宇宙が絡み合った系を形成しているという十分な証拠があり、絡み合った系を還元不可能な全体として扱う十分な理由があります。 様式的には、メレオロジー（部分と全体の関係を扱う理論・視座）は、多元主義者が存在の根拠として呼び出す究極の部分を持たずに、原子のない汚れの可能性を許容する。
Jonathan Schaffer
https://www.jonathanschaffer.org/
Papers (Topics: Monism)
Synopsis: Attempt to clarify a rationale and meaning for quantum holism
Topics: Quantum mechanics, Grounding, Monism
Synopsis: Argument that the cosmos is the one and only fundamental thing, since it is the one and only thing that evolves by the fundamental laws
Topics: Monism, Substance
Synopsis: Reply to Horgan & Potrc's defense of existence monism over priority monism
Topics: Monism
Synopsis: Attempt to revive the core neo-Hegelian argument for monism, based on universal internal relatedness
Topics: Monism
Synopsis: Defense of the idea that the world is the one and only (ultimate) truthmaker
Topics: Truthmaking, Monism
Synopsis: Discussion of the issue between (priority) monists and pluralists, and defense of (priority) monism
Topics: Monism
Synopsis: Arguments for monistic substantivalism (supersubstantivalism) over dualistic substantivalism (substantival spacetime plus distinct material substances)
Topics: Spacetime, Monism
Synopsis: Review of Hüttemann's book, arguing that the main arguments support monism (macrophysicalism) rather than Hüttemann's own egalitarian view
Topics: Physicalism, Monism
Synopsis: Overview of metaphysical monisms, and discussions of existence monism (exactly one thing exists) and priority monism (exactly one thing is fundamental)
Topics: Monism
Synopsis: Arguments that the mereological nihilist should prefer one big extended simple (existence monism) over many small simples
Topics: Mereology, Monism